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CASE COMMENT
COMMERCIAL SPEECH: MANDATORY DISCLAIMERS IN THE
REGULATION OF MISLEADING ATTORNEY ADVERTISING
Mason v. FloridaBar, 208 F.3d 952 (11th Cir. 2000)"
Stacy Borisov**
Petitioner' filed suit against The Florida Bar, claiming that the
imposition of a mandatory disclaimer on his yellow pages advertisement
violated his First Amendment rights.2 The advertisement stated that
Petitioner was "AV Rated, the Highest Rating [in the] Martindale-Hubbell
National Law Directory." 3 The Florida Bar did not contest the truth of
Petitioner's rating,4 but rather argued that the advertisement violated Rule
4-7.20)' of the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar, which prohibited selflaudatory statements. 6 The Florida Bar maintained that, in order to avoid
misleading the public, Petitioner's statement must be accompanied by an
objective explanation of the rating's meaning, such as the basis for including
individual attorneys in the rating system and the confidential nature of
source opinions used to rate them.7 The district court found for The Florida
Bar, upholding Rule 4-7.20) against Petitioner's constitutional challenge."
* Editor's Note: This case comment received the Huber C. Hurst Award for the
outstanding case comment for Fall 2000.
** Special thanks to R George Wright, Professor of Law at Indiana University, who
recommended this topic and gave advice all along the way, and to my husband, Dimitry, who
gave up my company and his use of the computer for many hours while this was written.
1. Petitioner was a criminal defense attorney who had submitted a proof of his
advertisement to the Florida Bar for an advisory opinion prior to its publication. Mason v. Fla.
Bar, 208 F.3d 952, 954 (11 th Cir. 2000).
2. Id Petitioner also challenged the rule at issue as void for vagueness under the First
Amendment as it applies to the states via the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id The district court rejected this argument Id at 955. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed the ruling, finding that the rule's broad language was nonetheless plain and gave
adequate notice to attorneys. Id at 959.
3. Id at 954.
4. Id Additionally, the state bar did not contest use of the rating or the name of the rating
organization, but rather the inclusion of the words "the Highest Rating." Id
5. Rule 4-7.20) has since been replaced by Rule 4-7.2(b) with only one minor change, the
removal of reference to "self.laudatory" statements. Id at 954 n.2.
6. Id at 954. Rule 4-7.20) provides: "A lawyer shall not make statements that are merely
self-laudatory or statements describing or characterizing the quality of the lawyer's services in
advertisements and written communications ... " Rules Regulating The Florida Bar, Rule 47.20).
7. Mason, 208 F.3d. at 954.
8. Id at 955.
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On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and HELD, The
Florida Bar's requirement of a disclaimer explaining the rating was an
unconstitutional restriction on commercial speech.9
The First Amendment has long protected the free flow of political
ideas.'° Constitutional protection of commercial speech developed out of
the recognition that consumer interest in commercial information may be
greater than many people's concern for the political issues of the day."
Within the American legal community, however, an old English rule of
professional etiquette evolved over the years into a largely uncontested rule
of ethics that prohibited commercial advertising of legal services until
recently."
The U.S. Supreme Court addressed the unique policy issues raised by
the advertising of professionals for the first time, in the mid-1970s,
beginning with the medical field.' 3 Thereafter, Bates v. State Bar of
Arizona,"' in 1977, was the earliest major challenge to the long-standing
ban on attorney advertising. The plaintiffs in Bates attacked the validity of
a state disciplinary rule that barred lawyers from publicizing themselves in
any form of advertisement. 5 The U.S. Supreme Court, agreeing with the
plaintiffs' challenge, found that blanket suppression of attorney advertising
was unconstitutional.' The ruling addressed numerous proffered
justifications for the prohibition, including the adverse effects on8
professionalism,' potential degradation of the quality of legal services,
and the difficulty of enforcing any restriction less than a complete ban. 9

9. Id. at 959.
10. E.g., Buckley v. Valco, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976).
11. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748,763 (1976)

("As to the particular consumer's interest in the free flow of commercial information, that interest
may be as keen, if not keener by far, than his interest in the... most urgent political debate.");

see also Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 364 (1977) ("[T]he consumer's concern for the
free flow of commercial speech often may be far keener than his concern for urgent political

dialogue.").
12., Bates, 433 U.S. at 371.
13. Va. State Bd of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 766.
14. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
15. Id at 355-56. Petitioners conceded their advertisement violated the disciplinary rule but
nonetheless challenged the constitutionality of the rule. Id. A second claim that the rule violated

the Sherman Act due to its tendency to limit competition was rejected by the Court. Id at 363.
16. Id. at 383.
17. See id at 368-72.
18. See id at 378.
19. See id. at 379. Other proffered justifications included the inherently misleading nature
of attorney advertising, adverse effects on the administration of justice, and the undesirable
economic effects of advertising. See id at 372-78.
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Ultimately, the Court found that none ofthese justifications outweighed the
public's substantial interest in the free flow of commercial speech.20
Attorney advertising, however, was not left wholly unrestrained. 2 The
Court noted that some regulation would be acceptable because commercial
speech is not easily chilled given the economic interest involved.' Clearly
permissible prohibitions included false, deceptive, or facially misleading
advertising.' But the Court did not decide whether other types of
advertising, such as statements regarding the quality of services offered,
could be subject to limited regulation.24 The Court suggested such
advertising "may be so likely to be misleading as to warrant restriction." 2
Specifically, the Bates decision expressly left open the door to limited but
mandatory supplementation in the form of advertising disclaimers, in order
to protect consumers.26
Three years later, in CentralHudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public
Service Commission of New York, 27 the U.S. Supreme Court formulated a

constitutional standard to apply generally to all regulation of commercial
speech.28 In deciding whether a complete ban on advertising by a utility
company violated the First Amendment, the Court articulated a four-part
test.29 The first part asks whether the expression is protected by the First
Amendment.30 To be protected at all, the speech must "at least" promote
lawful activity and not be misleading.' Second, in order to justify
restricting the speech the state interest must be substantial.3 2 Third, the
regulation must directly advance that interest.3 The Court cited Bates on
this point, noting how the ban on attorney advertisements did not directly
advance the proffered state interest of protecting professional standards.'
Finally, the regulation must be narrowly drawn so that the interest could not
20. See id at 365.
21. Id at383.
22. Id.; see also Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748, 772 n.24 (1976) ("[Clommercial speech may be more durable than other kinds... [since]
there is little likelihood of its being chilled by proper regulation and forgone entirely.").
23., Bates, 433 U.S. at 383.
24. Id at 383-84.
25. Id
26. Id at 384.
27. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
28. Id at 564-66.
29. Id. at 566.
30. Id.
31. Id
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id at 564-65.
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be advanced by a "more limited restriction."35 Again, as in Bates, the Court
suggested limited supplementation, such as a mandatory disclaimer, as an
example of a more narrowly drawn regulation.36
Although the Court has regularly applied the CentralHudson test since
1980,37 Supreme Court justices have not always agreed upon the proper
application of that test in subsequent cases. Disagreement over the
definition and exact role of the term "misleading" was a central issue in
Peel v. Attorney Registration& DisciplinaryCommission ofIllinois. 3"The
Court ultimately found that a State cannot censure an attorney's statement
of certification as a civil trial specialist. 39 The majority, concurring, and
dissenting opinions4° all agreed that the statement at issue was not actually
misleading,4 with the majority noting that the representation was truthful.42
However, the Court divided on whether the statement was inherentlyor
potentially misleading and how such findings would affect the
constitutionality of regulating such speech.
The majority resisted finding that the statement of certification was
potentially misleading because the statement was a verifiable fact, not an
opinion as to quality.43 Nevertheless, the majority opinion asserted that even
if the statement was potentially misleading, prohibiting it entirely was too
broad a measure when the State may consider a disclaimer as an alternate

35. Id. at 564, 566.
36. Id. at 565.
37. See In re RM.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982) (advertisement listing practice areas and
courts admitted to practice in, along with announcement cards mailed direct to the public); see
also Shapero v. Ky. Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 472 (1988) (direct mailing of advertisement);
Zaunderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 638 (1985) (advertisement geared to
persons with specific legal problems and containing illustration).
38. 496 U.S. 91 (1990).
39. Id at I 1.The National Board of Trial Advocacy had issued petitioner a "Certificate
in Civil Trial Advocacy" based on a set of standards, including trial experience, participation in
continuing legal education programs, and an examination. Id. at 95-96.
40., Four justices joined in the majority opinion. See id at 93-111. Two justices, one who
had joined in the majority opinion and one who had not, joined in a concurring opinion. See id.
concurring). One dissenting opinion was submitted by a single justice. See
at I1I-17 (Marshall, J.,
id at 118-19 (White, J.,
dissenting). Finally, three justices joined in a second dissenting opinion.
See id at 119-27 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
41. See id at 106, 111 (Marshall, J., concurring), 118 (White, J.,dissenting), 120
(O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
42. Id at 100-01.
43. Id.at 101 ("A claim of certification is not an unverifiable opinion of the ultimate quality
of a lawyer's work or a promise of success ...but is simply a fact, albeit one with multiple
predicates, from which a consumer may or may not draw an inference of the likely quality of an
attorney's work in a given area of practice.").
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form of regulation." The concurrence, on the other hand, clearly found that
the statement was potentially misleading because facts, when not
accompanied with adequate information, can lead to multiple and
sometimes false inferences."' The concurrence also noted that a mandatory
disclaimer itself should be narrowly tailored to avoid imposing an effective
ban through burdensome language requirements.46 As for the dissents, both
agreed that the statement was at least potentially misleading.47 Three
dissenting Justices added that if potentially misleading speech cannot be
presented in a non-deceptive manner without the added problems of a
burdensome disclaimer then it should be prohibited.4 The same three
Justices also asserted that the statement was "inherently" misleading and,
therefore, unprotected by the First Amendment because the meaning of the
certification was not common knowledge, readily verifiable, or
understandable on its face.49
Following Peel, the Court upheld two additional constitutional
challenges to the regulation of attorney advertising," thereby establishing
a clear trend toward non-regulation and less deference to the State.
Surprisingly then, in FloridaBar v. Went for It, Inc.," the most recent

Supreme Court ruling on attorney advertising, the Court found in favor of
challenged state regulation by a narrow 5-4 majority.52 Wentfor It involved
a constitutional challenge to a prohibition against direct mail solicitation of

44. Id. at 106, 110.
45. Id at 115 (Marshall, J., concurring).
46. Id at 117-18 n.2 (Marshall, J., concurring); see also Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary
Counsel, 471 U.S. 626,663-64 (1985) ("[A] requirement... that would fill far more space than
the advertisement itselff] would chill the publication of protected commercial speech and would
be entirely out of proportion to the State's legitimate interest in preventing potential deception.").
47. Peel, 496 U.S. at 118 (White, J., dissenting), 125 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
48. Id at 125 (O'Connor, ., dissenting) ("Ifthe information cannot be presented in a way
that is not deceptive, even statements that are merely potentially misleading may be regulated with
an absolute prohibition."). The dissent noted that it would be difficult to reasonably fit all the
information the bar found necessary to prevent deception in this case into the letterhead on which
this statement was printed. Id
49. Id at 122-23 (O'Connor, ., dissenting). The dissent noted that nothing in the letterhead
revealed how one might verify the certification. Id at 122.
50. See Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761 (1993) (in-person solicitation); Ibanez v. Fla. Dept.
of Bus. & Prof'l Regulation 512 U.S. 136 (1994) (advertising of CPA and CFP credentials).
51. 515 U.S. 618 (1995).
52. Idat 619, 635.
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victims or their families within thirty days of an accident." The proffered
state interest was protecting the reputations of Florida lawyers by
preventing conduct that the public deems deplorable.'
The majority and dissenting opinions in Wentfor It differed on whether
the state interest was substantial." But disagreement over the third part of
the CentralHudson test, whether the restriction-directly advanced the state
interest, generated the most discussion within the opinion.' The majority
found that the state bar satisfactorily proved that a concrete, nonspeculative harm existed and that the regulation would in fact alleviate that
harm to a material degree, thereby directly advancing the state interest."
This conclusion was based largely on evidence submitted by the state bar,
specifically a 106-page summary of statistical and anecdotal data derived
from a two-year study of public views on attorney advertising and
solicitation.5 The dissent, on the other hand, asserted that this evidence did
not prove the existence of actual harm. 9 In particular, the study neither
included actual surveys, nor indicated sample size, methodology used, or
what data was excluded from the record.' The dissent urged that in order
to show that a regulation directly and materially advances the state interest
"require[s] something more than a few pages of self-serving and
unsupported statements by the State."'
In the instant case, Petitioner filed a claim in federal court after
exhausting his administrative appeals of The Florida Bar's decision to

53. Id at620-21.
54. Id at 624-25.
55. The Court accepted as a substantial interest the state bar's argument that "because
direct-mail solicitations in the wake of accidents are perceived by the public as intrusive. . . the
reputation of the legal profession in the eyes of Floridians has suffered commensurately." Id at
625. The dissent, however, rejected this argument and asserted "we do not allow restrictions on
speech to be justified on the ground that the expression might offend the listener." Id at 638
(Kennedy, J., dissenting). Indeed, whether this amounts to a substantial state interest is doubtful
in light of previous holdings. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 648
(1985) (Mhe mere possibility that some members of the population might find advertising...
offensive cannot justify suppressing it").
56. Wentforlt, 515 U.S. at626-32.
57. Id at626; see also Edenfield v. Fae, 507 U.S. 761,770-71 (1993) ("This burden is not
satisfied by mere speculation or conjecture; rather, a governmental body seeking to sustain a
restriction on commercial speech must demonstrate that the harms it recites are real and that its
restrictions will in fact alleviate them to a material degree.").
58. Went for It, 515 U.S. at 626-27. The Florida Bar conducted this two-year study, which
included hearings, commissioned surveys, and review ofextensive public commentary. Id at 620.
59. Id at 640 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
60. Id (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
61. Id at 641 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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require a disclaimer on his advertisement. 62 Petitioner alleged that the
State' 3 had no substantial interest in requiring him to include a disclaimer
about the Martindale-Hubbell rating system and, in the alternative, that the
state bar had failed to produce sufficient evidence to justify such
regulation.' 4 The ultimate issue was whether the disclaimer requirement, as
the regulation of commercial speech, was permissible under the four-part
CentralHudson test.65 The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals found that

the state bar did not meet all the requirements ofthe test and, therefore, the
proposed regulation of the attorney's commercial speech was
unconstitutional.'
Regarding the first and second parts of the Central Hudson test, the

Eleventh Circuit found that the statement was protected speech within the
First Amendment and that the state interests were substantial. 7 With
respect to the former conclusion, the court noted that Petitioner's
advertisement was truthful." With respect to the latter, two ofthe proffered
interests were upheld as substantial: to ensure that advertisements by
attorneys are not misleading' and that the public has access to relevant
information for comparing and selecting legal representation.7 Both are
derived from the general state interest of protecting consumers and the
state bar's duty to regulate attorneys.
However, in the court's opinion, the state bar failed to satisfy the third
part of the Central Hudson test,' which requires that the substantial
interest be directly advanced by the proposed regulation. The court asserted
that the burden placed on the State is to demonstrate an identifiable harm
that is mitigated in a direct and effective manner by the regulation.' Under
this analysis, it is presumed that if an identifiable harm is not demonstrated,
the effectiveness of the regulation becomes moot.7' In the instant case, the

62. Mason v. Fla. Bar, 208 F.3d 952, 954 (1ith Cir. 2000); see also supra text
accompanying notes 3-7.

63. In this context. action by a state bar is attributable to the State and therefore the two
terms may be used interchangeably.
64. Mason, 208 F.3d at 954-55.
65. Id at 955.
66. Id at 958-59.
67. Id at 955-56.
68. Id at 955.
69. Id at 956.

70. Id
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id
Id at 958.
Id at 956.
See id
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state bar's mere assertion, without further evidence, that the language of
the advertisement was "potentially misleading" did not demonstrate to the
court that an identifiable harm existed. On that point, the state bar argued
that "simple common sense" dictates that the general public's unfamiliarity
with the Martindale-Hubbell rating system will lead to an overvaluation of
the phrase "'AV' Rated, the Highest Rating."'76 But the court found that the
record lacked proof of actual harm to the general public as a result of
Petitioner's or similar advertisements." A review of the record indicated
that it contained neither factual findings, in the form of studies and
empirical evidence, nor anecdotal accounts ofpublic harm.78 In response to
the state bar's argument that the general public would be misled due to its
unfamiliarity with Martindale-Hubbell's rating system, the court declared
that "[u]nfamiliarity is not synonymous with misinformation."'"
The state bar also advanced the argument that because it required only
a disclaimer, rather than imposing a complete ban, such speech regulation
was permissible based merely on a statement's potential for harm.' The
court rejected this argument as well and asserted that even partial
restrictions must be justified by some identifiable harm.8 Therefore, since
all four parts of the CentralHudsontest must be satisfied for any regulation
of commercial speech to be found constitutional and since the State failed
to meet its burden under the third part, any further analysis by the court as
to the fourth part was unnecessary.'
Despite what appeared to be a shift in direction by the U.S. Supreme

Court, the Eleventh Circuit in the instant case clearly did not take the Went
for It decision" as an indication that States should be accorded more
deference than they had received in the past. In fact, the instant case
illustrates the way in which Went for It, although upholding a state
75. Id. at 956-58; see also lbanez v. Fla. Dept. of Bus. & Prof'I Regulation, 512 U.S. 136,
146 (1994) ("[Wle cannot allow rote invocation of the words 'potentially misleading' to supplant
the [State's] burden....").
76. Mason, 208 F. 3d at 956-57. The state bar's only evidence in support of its position was
an affidavit and testimony by the bar's director of advertising and ethics, along with text from the
Introduction to the Martindale-Hubbell National Law Directory which stated that the directory's
objective was to meet the needs of the legal community. Id at 957.
77. Id at 957-58.
78. Id
79. Id. at 957; see also Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm'n, 496 U.S. 91,
102-03 (1990) ("Inhere is no evidence that the consumers... are misled if they do not inform
themselves of the precise standards under which claims of certification are allowed.").
80. Mason, 208 F.3d at 958.
81. Id.
82. Id
83. See supra text accompanying notes 51-61.
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regulation," has placed a significant burden on the State. 85 The court's
principal conclusion was that the State failed to show an identifiable harm
because no proof beyond "common sense" was presented to indicate a true
potential for misleading the public." A key assertion in the instant opinion
was that although "empirical data... is not a sine qua non for a finding of
constitutionality, the Supreme Court has not accepted 'common sense'
alone to prove the existence of a concrete, non-speculative harm."'" Despite
this language and considering the focus placed by the Eleventh Circuit on
a need for "concrete evidence,"" it is difficult to imagine a case in which a
State could effectively demonstrate an identifiable harm that results from
potentially misleading speech without presenting empirical data. What this
case means for the state bars of Florida, Georgia, and Alabama," at the
very least, is that to engage in any prophylactic regulation of attorney
advertising may require a great deal of homework first.

On the other hand, it appears that the Eleventh Circuit might have
upheld the proposed regulation if the state bar had only produced some sort
of minimal evidence of identifiable harm. Such evidence may not need to be
extensive or greatly scientific considering the Went for It dissent's

interpretation of that record.'0 Ifthe court had found that the State's burden
in showing identifiable harm was met, the fact that the regulation at issue
took the form of a disclaimer likely would have helped on the remaining
issues, given the language in Bates and Peel. A disclaimer would alleviate
the potential harm by providing the public with information deemed

necessary by the State to ensure that the statement would not be
overvalued.' The public would understand that the AV rating was based

on subjective opinions ofconfidential sources rather than objective criteria,

84.
85.
86.
87.'

Fla. Bar v. Went for It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618,635 (1995).
See id. at 626.
See Mason, 208 F.3d. at 956-57.
Id at 957.

88. Id at 958.
89. The Eleventh Circuit, in which this case was decided, is made up of the states of
Florida, Georgia, and Alabama.
Inc., 515 U.S. 618,640-41 (1995) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)
90. See Fla. Bar v. Went for It,
and supratext accompanying notes 59-61.
91. See supra notes 26 and 44 and accompanying text.
92. For example, one concern of The Florida Bar was that the public be informed that not
all Florida attorneys are rated by the Martindale-Hubbell National Law Directory. Mason, 208

F.3d. at 954. Presumably, with this information the public would be deterred from concluding that
another attorney not rated by Martindale-Hubbell necessarily provides lesser quality

representation.
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such as years of experience or scores on an examination.93 Additionally, as
numerous cases have asserted, a disclaimer is a form of acceptable
supplementation providing a "more limited restriction." Of course, as
noted in Peel, the state bar would still have had the final and significant
burden of showing that the information to be included in the mandatory
disclaimer would not be so burdensome as to become prohibitive in itself."
The state bar's insistence on "a full explanation as to the meaning... and
how the publication chooses the participating attorneys"" appears rather
burdensome indeed. Thus, it is uncertain if the fourth part of the Central
Hudson test would be met if a State provides documented evidence of harm
in future cases involving similar disclaimers.
Finally, it is important to note that the computer age is well underway
in the United States. As information becomes easier to obtain via the
Internet, a State's concern for an uninformed public may be increasingly
unnecessary. Whereas once a consumer might have had to visit the local
library to verify information about a directory such as Martindale-Hubbell,
now he or she can log on at home or at work and find the same information
within minutes.97 In light of our information-rich society that has evolved
with today's technologies, it appears the Eleventh Circuit properly followed
precedent in effectively requiring state bars to obtain evidence of actual
harm before regulating factually-truthfid commercial speech on the
assumption that an uninformed public will be misled.

93. Cf Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm'n, 496 U.S. 91, 95 (1990).
NBTA certification standards include objective criteria such as experience as lead counsel and
successful completion of an examination. The Peel majority relied heavily on these objective
criteria when it found that the statement was not potentially misleading. Id at 101-02.
94. Eg., Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 564
(1980).
95. Peel, 496 U.S. at 117 n.2.
96. Mason, 208 F.3d at 954.
97. See Mason v. Fla. Bar, 29 F. Supp. 2d 1329, 1330 (Fla. 1998) (noting that information
explaining the ratings is available in libraries and on the Internet).

